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Ol~cc.rrFERENC~

MORTAXA )
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lfATIOBAL ASSOCIATION OIP BROADCASTERS
THE BROWB PALACE HOTEL, DEICVm, COIDRADO
OCTOBER 31, 1972, 12 : 00 NOOU, M. S. T.

CHIBA ABD SHIPTilfG POLICIES Ill ASIA

It is fashionable these days to make critical appraisals
of the quality of our 1nstitut1ons.

These appraisals of the media,

Congress, the Presidency and whatever, are not to be scorned,
even when we are put out by what may seem to us to be their
i nval i dity.

In the end, i nstitutions are better off for the sum

total of critici sm.

It provi des a continuous test of their vitality.

Inst i tutions which react to criticism, whether it is accepted

~r

resented, are, at least, live i nst itutions and if they are alive,
there is hope that they have or can develop the capacity to serve
the human purposes for whi ch they are intended.
Over a long period of public service, I have not iced that
criticism tends to move in waves of greater or lesser amplitude.
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Thia year, it is the

~-

1

pr~cesa,

last year

the courte or the Congress and before that the preaa or the
untveraittea.

If there is one certainty underlying the shifting

pulsations, however, it is that national perspectives are also in
continuous flux, enabling adjustments to be made in our system
which preserve

the nation's continuity.

It is to this phenomenon of sh1.ft1ng perspective, parttcularly aa it effects the problem of the Far East that I would
like to addreas myself today.

The past year and a half has been

a period of momentous changes in the whole structure of the nation's
foreign policy.

These changes derive from profound revtslons in

the basic assumptions which have guided our national destiny for
a quarter of a century.
friends.

Old enemies have been embraced as new

Old causes have been exposed to new light and in that

light have often revealed the tarnish of obsolescence.
have toppled and crumbled.
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Shibboleths

to ua far too
slowly in many cases.

As a nation, we have paid an enormous

price tor the delays .

For a host of reasons, ror which both my

profeasion and yours must bear a great deal of blame, our national
perspectives on foreign policy have tended to calcify in certain
situations.

When that has occurred, myth has superceded reality

as the basis for our foreign policies.

The most pervasive of

these myths and, as it turned out, the most damaging, was that
related to the People's Republic of China .

Two decades ago, a

revolutionary China came to be seen as a towering dragon, held
on a leash by Moscow, enveloping cringing neighbors 1n billowing
clouds of smoke and fire .
The myth was born from the total Nationalist collapse
on the Chtnese mainland .

As some of you will remember, this up-

heaval produced enormous repercussions on the American political
scene .
China. '

We searched everywhere for the culprits who had 'lost
An America which had just "lost ' a monopoly of nuclear
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. .apoiUI, tn port

throus~ ~ ~ ~ntornattonal

could not underatand
and betrayal.

ooplonaao,

losing China 11 except in tera. or conspiracy

Pluahed with the oan1potence ot our military alght

during World War II, it had not yet dawned on ua that a nation
of aore than

80~

million was not ours or anyone elae's to win or

lose .
Our reaponse to what had tranapired 1n China was to
erect a ring of treaties to choke orr what was thought to be
China'•

a~aresslve

designs.

SEATO and the mutual defense treaties

wtth the Republic or China, Japan, and the Republic or Korea, all
formed segaenta of the ring .
U.

s.

With these treaties came U. S. bases,

troops to man the baaes, billions or dollara in military

aid, and advisors to show our allies how to use the arms.

It was

aa though we were trying to pen the wild dragon with pacts and
progr~.

Anyone having the slightest acquaintance with the

aade-tn Japan super-science fict i on which ts shown on the TV
networka knowa that it takes a lot more.

Mss65_22_B77_F29_04.CR2

-~

Ironically ,

wh~~ort.: ~a

China which we

thought to be reckless, belligerent and powerfUl, the Chinese
leaders saw t hemselves as engaged in a bootstrap operation, minding
t heir own business and beset on all sides by hostility .
denounced

u. s.

defense policies, the U.

s.

boycott and

China

u. s.

s upport

of Taiwan as extensions o r the Western world's efforts for 150 years
to dominate and exploit China .
Now, after a long and surly confrontation, the Unit ed States
and China have begun the j ourney to r estor e normal relations .

To

bring about this change, the President of the United States, himself,
entered t he dragon's lair and emerged not onl y unscathed, but, c l earl y
reassured, exhilarated and certainly, as the TV coverage r eveal ed,
well-fed.
I applauded the President's initiative at the time and I
have done so many times since.

Its significance is in no way dimin-

ished by t he fact that there has not been a rapid or dramatic followup.

Clearly, t hat was not the intention or the visit.
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Nevertheless,

and Premier Chou touched

glasses in Peking's Great Hall of t he People, waves or subsurface
motion were set in motion in Asia.

The moment marked the beginning

ot a new era in our relations with China and the Western Pacific .
The basis tor t his change, to a large extent, is to be round 1n what
has taken place inside China.
Senator Scott and I spent sixteen days 1n the Chinese
People's Republic last APril and May and bOth ot us reached substantially the same conclusions abOut what had
China.

t~ten

place within

Our conclusions, moreover, do not differ greatly trom those

ot other recent American visitors who may have had, as did we, some
previous exposure to the old China.
The contrast is extraordinary.

The present system enjoys

general and, perhaps, enthusiastic acceptance.

It does so notwith-

standing the fact that China is controlled more clesely than ever betore and is tar more tightly organized.

It does so notwithstanding

the absence of intellectual and artistic freedom and representative
governaent in our sense ot these terms.
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It should be

JCOl~ t~~ valueD are not those

or the Chinese people.

What appeanJ to be or great relevance to us

may have little meaning on the other side or the Pacific.

clearly ot significance 1n China,

tod~,

What ie

is the tact that the present

syetan provic2es adequate tOOd, shelter, clothing and a1mple consumer
goods.

It haa led to great advances 1n public cleanliness and order,

1n health care, 1n basic and technical education, 1n transportation,

electrification and the like.

It has developed a diversified national

economy which is able to manufacture--and to manufacture solely out

ot Chinese resources and skills--teno ot thousands ot modern products.
There are Chinese-made automobiles, tractors and electric buses, not
to apeak or Chinese-made hydro-electric generators and nuclear devices.
What is or great relevance to the Chinese, too, ia that
the structure of' national control is manned trom top to bOttom,
not by a conspicuous and highly privileged elite as 1n the paet
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but

by

men and women who work among the people, who dress

like them and live with them.

Confo~ty

there is, as there

has always been in China, but it is not the conformity induced
by a visible whip.
absence.

Indeed, enforcers were conspicuous by their
I do not t hink I saw more than an armed person

or two or any kind during 5,000 miles of travel in China.
What is to be found is a general sense of participation
in nation-building.

A bona tide national family is emerging,

with a •one for all and all for one" concept of social and
economic development.

The present system seems to have

s~cceeded

in undergirding the personal pride of the Chinese in China.
Chou En-lai put

it~

aThe Chinese people can stand up again."

As never before, China seems strong, dynamic, unified and
virtually classless.
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- 9 As this vast

have beat a

p~th

to

CQ lt.:~):

Chin~'s

door.

for the beginning of rapprochement.

momentu., nations

For us, the time was over-ripe
The tact is that, tor several

years, hostility between the United States and China haa been
receding.

Long before the President's visit, th1s country had

ceased to be, in

Ch1n~'s

eyes, an unmtt1gated ogre.

Our policies

chose to ignore this change 1n Chinese outlook for many years but
actually, the focus of Peking's concern began to shift elsewhere
a decade ago, notably to the Soviet Union and to Japan.

Only the

intrusion of the Vietnamese involvement concealed the extent of
the ahU't.
Today~

the Soviet Union appears to give greater cause

for anxiety to the Chinese than does the United States.
ot course, a reversal of the

sttu~tton

That is,

of two decades ago.

In

the early days of the People's Republic, historical irritants,
having t

do with Soviet encroachments on the reaches of Chtnese

civilization into Central Asia and Manchuria were ignored in the
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light ot what seesaed

The c Olllftlunist

bond between the two natlons, moreover, was reinforced by the
unifying impact ot tbe bostllit7 which was directed at both
countries tra. the Uni ted States and other nations.
D1tterences in ldeolo&Y have s i nce come to light between
China and the Soviet union.
wounds ot history.

Border clashes have again opened the

The one-million Soviet troops and allied

Mongolian torces along the inner Chinese border are now regarded
as at least as menacing as American military installations on
Okinawa, Guam, the Ph1.lipp1nes or other places in the Paciftc or
the prospect ot a re-armed Japan.
It the recent visits ot President Wixon and the Congresalonal leaderahip stgnal the ottic1at end ot the

11

cold war'' in

Aaia, the euccesatul mission or Prtme Minister Tanaka ot Japan to
Peking cont1rma it.

In turn, Sino-Japanese rapprochement foreshadows

the further erosion ot the special United States relationship with
Japan which has existed since World War II.
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(F>(f~[R)¥

The passing of ~
in my

Judgment~

-ot ft!i11s special

is all to the good.

relationship~

The fact is that for a quarter

of a century Japan has depended on the United States not only for
security but also for
has been costly .

econ~

ic well-being.

Por UB 1 the arrangement

FOr the Japanese, the sense of inferiority which

it has implied has become increasingl y intolerable, as the experiences of World War II have receded into the past and Japan has
risen to the level of the third economic power of the world .
Premier Tanaka's initiative towards China opens
more than new possibilities for Japanese trade.

~P

It also uncovers

a potential for new and

const~uc tive

political relationships with

other nations in Asia.

In due course, Japan's rapprochement with

China is likely to have significant impact on the

u.

s.-Japanese
mutual defense
security relationship since it alters the basic rationale of the/
treaty.

Indeed, it is hard to imagine a more extensive erosion of

a premise than that which has swept away the assumptions on which
the treaty was based two decades ago.

Those assumptions saw an

aggressive China restrained from pouncing on Japan at the behest
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grace or the interposition

ot

u. s.

So complete has been the reversal or

military might .

these assumptions that the President has been able to visit 1n
one year, both Peking and Moscow and receive 1n both capitals a
moat cordial welcome.

And

so~

too, have the Japanese leaders.

What the comings and goings or heads-or-states indicate
is that the dikes of post world War II relationships have given
way in Asia.

Erosive tides are at work on the existing alignments

among the large nations--China, Japan, the Soviet Union and the
United States.

They are also being felt among the smaller nations.

Atter two decades or hurling invective at each other, tor

example~

the two Koreas are talking of stabilization of the situation on the
Korean peninsula.

~ing

the Soviet Union, and
durable peace in Asia.

as it does in the triangle between China,

Japan~

that stabilization ia essential to a

It is a key to political balance at t he

Northeast Asian corner of the Asian mainland in a way similar to
that or Indochina in SOutheast Asia.

A solution to the Korean
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onl

question on the basis

1t:'ra11zat1on is

likely to lie a long way in the tuture but at least the signs
of a beginning are in the air.
As i'or 'l'ha"iland, it has followed the American lead and
accepted a Chinese invitation to take its table tennis team to
Peking.
In

There in renewed dialogue between Indonea1a and China .

all probability, it is only a matter of time before Thailand,

Indonesia, the Philippines. Malaysia, Australia and New Zeal and
follow the

u. s.
In S\tm,

lead in restoring political contact with China .
t he leaves or past policies, myths and mistakes

are scurrying into history.
in Asia.

A new era has already begun to

eme~e

Still intact, however, is the ring of anti-Chinese

treaties which was put t ogether two decades ago by the United
States.

Robbed of a mi l i t ant China to checkJ these treaties are

now more shadow than substance .

Yet, they cost uo enormously out

of our resources and will continue to do so for as long as they
remain in their present form .
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- 14 The fact ts
?n the Asian
~r

{Ct(g!ied

continen~

no vital interests

which warrant the kind ot massive cOMmitment

men and material that we have witnessed in Indochina and else-

where in Aala during the past decade .
That is not to say that the United States is
Pac,t1c power.
v~tal

n~t

a

As d1sttnct from the Asian mainland, we do have

tntere1ts tn what transpires in the Paciftc Ocean.

To safe-

guard these interests in present circumstances, however, does not
require us to maintain hundreds or thousands o! forces and

~ver

a

hundred major military bases in and around the ria of Asia at a
cost of b1111ona of dollars annually.

Commitments to join in the

detenae of this region agatnat aggression does not require us to
garrison various countries with U.

s.

troops or to deluge them

with vast quantities of costly arms and assistance.
Treaties and agreements and aid-programs are not ch i seled
into stone.

Ltke any other aspect

or

a nation's policies, they

must be kept current if the publtc interest ts to be served.
Inaotar ae Aeia is involved, we ehould .atch our coaaitaents ,
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(!

today'
p

ot res:)urces to

pl ymcnt of

real!.t' cs ond not 1n c ::mf'.:>rclty \ 1th the

Th o pr-nctple certa1nly appl1en to the Japanese - U. S.

at.

Security
c stly

~Teaty,

the Korenn Treaty, to SEATO and to the various

id-programs and defense arrange entc to which they hnve

g ven rise.

It would be my hope that the next

regardless of lte political complexion--will
rn k

ythB or the

necessary adj1stments .

Ad~1n1stra t 1on--

m~ve

promptly to

Cert tnly, the change 1n attitude

towards China, on the p3rt of both the Unlted States and Japan
h s opened up substantial poss1b111t1es in thts connection.
Oversh9d~w1ng

th

the

h~petul

developments tn Asia of

st yenr there tongs the war in Indochina.

wh ch seems to teed on itself.

It 1s a war

It ecnerntes its own

m~mentum ,

1ncreaoingly unrelated to any conceivable • • • interest ot th s
nat'Lon.
our

It io "' r wh.,ac continuance, lnclecd, docs violence to

tntcrcsto.
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our own rhetor1c 1 by our
own inertia, perhaps, by our own emphasis on "saving face,

a

luxury which once was assumed to be exclusively an oriental
prerogative.

u. s.

Whatever the

case~

the war drags on.

The .forms of

engagement change and so, too, does the rationale or engagement .

But our deep and costly invol vement on the Southeast Asian main land
seems to go on forever .
My

sentiments regarding this situation, I am sure, have

been known to all or you for many years .

I continue to hope that

before, on, or immediatel y after the election--the sooner t he better-we will bring to an end this deadly travesty.

That we should have

done so years ago makes the urgency no less compelling .
Por a decade, we have pursued a war in which we became
involved because of the calcification or our policies towards China.
Those policies lost whatever basis they may have had years ago.
Thanks to the President, we have broken out of their ancient grip.
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a hideous derivative

Is it not time now that

of those policies, the military involvement in Indochina, is even more
invalid?

If the old China policy was wrong, how can our continued

immersion in Viet Narn possibly be right?
The horror of unnecessary deat hs and injuries, inflicted on
Americans, Vietnamese, Laotians, and Cambodians is bad enough.

But,

that is not the end of the price which is being paid for persistance
in this abomination.

Nor does t he price end in terms of the immense

burdens which the war places on the nation's economy or in the divisiveness wh ch the war injects, as a deadly drug, into the inner unity of
this nation .

The war also continues to distort international relation-

ships 1n t.1e Western Pacific and inhibits our capacity to make timely
adjustments in our approach to that region.
Critical questions of policy in the Western Pacific lie
beyond Viet Nam; they l ie beyond Cambodia and beyond Laos.

These

remote rice-cultures of Southeast Asia will some day return to the
obscurity which they once enjoyed.

The challenge of foreign policy

in Asia is in the building of a new foundation for peace in the
Western Pacific.
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- 19 If' we are to

~~~Xyto

that high purpose 1

1t la imperative
--that we end

~ur

military involvement in Indochina

f'orthwlth,
--that we adjust downward our direct military involvement 1n the Western Pacific to correspond to the chAnged political
situation,
--that we begin now to pursue a diplomacy
time, to establish a quadripartite base

o~

seeking~

in

Ch1na, Japan, the Soviet

Unton and the United States on which to build the peace and
stability or the region.
To be able to do what must be done for the
this nation in the

~ture

of

Paci~ic:

--We must concentrate on making American products competittve in world markets once more, and forego the building of
walls or monetary and trade isolationism around ourselves;
--We muat cease wasting our national substance and our

Mss65_22_B77_F29_18.CR2

energy on irrelevant
governments 'n

questionsble client

~sia;

--We must redouble our efforts
fr~ework

t~

establish a durable

of understanding with all Aeian nations , through more

effective use of the whole range of informntlon media,
candor and courage in

~ur

thr~ugh

otflctal apprRisal.a and through cultural

exchanges wlth all the natjons or Asla .
The waters of the Pac'tic break on the shores of the

United States, the
Pac~fic

r~viet

Un on, J pan, and Ch na.

We are all

powers with c?mmon tnterests ln tle p £eib1lfties or

peaceful relations in the regton.

The cold war is over in Asia.

May we find the wisdom, n?w, to match

~ur

policies

tunttles wh'ch the new situation presents.
be able t? turn

~ur

the oppor-

In so doing, we will

energies and our efforts ?nee again to building

peace in the Paclflc and ln the world,
and our children's

t~

r,r

~hildren .
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ourselves, 'ur chi11ren

